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Abstract
This article proposes that the UNHCR-supported “dur-
able solution” programs for former refugees from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and from Croatia were at odds with the 
actual exilic experiences of former refugees . It introduces 
homemaking as an essential aspect of a successful durable 
solution and proposes supplementing the usual ethno-
politicized understandings of home in the specific context 
with analyses of the process of homemaking at different 
scales—house (dwelling), community (the wider space of 
settlement containing natural, cultural, social, and eco-
nomic aspects) and nation . The article also argues that 
repatriation and local integration in the country of first 
asylum—two allegedly distinct and opposite solutions to 
refugee crises—should be viewed as intertwined processes 
within a broader transnational context . It is concluded 
that their combination brought a durable solution to refu-
gee predicaments in the specific case .
Résumé
Cet article propose que les programmes de « solutions 
durables » soutenus par le HCR pour les anciens réfugiés 
originaires de la Bosnie-Herzégovine et de la Croatie ne 
s’accordaient pas aux expériences vécues de ces réfugiés . 
Il introduit la notion d’établissement de domicile comme 
un élément essentiel d’une solution qui puisse réussir et 
propose de supplémenter les conceptions ethnopoliticisées 
habituelles concernant l’idée d’un domicile que l’on trouve 
dans ce contexte particulier avec des analyses du processus 
d’établir un domicile sur des échelles variées, notam-
ment celle du domicile en soi (lieu d’habitation), celle de 
la communauté plus large dans laquelle l’installation a 
lieu, contenant des éléments naturels, culturels, sociaux et 
économiques, et celle de la nation . L’article soutient aussi 
que le rapatriement et l’intégration locale dans le pays de 
premier asile, deux solutions aux crises de réfugiés qui ont 
été conçues comme distinctes et en opposition, devraient 
être considérées comme des processus complémentaires 
et interdépendants dans un contexte transnational plus 
général . Pour conclure, l’article avance que leur applica-
tion simultanée avait apporté une solution durable à des 
problématiques de réfugiés dans le cas particulier dont il 
est question .
Introduction
“The renovation of a house does not in itself make a home.” This sentiment was shared by a young Bosniac participant in a roundtable on home-
making and integration in post-Dayton Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, held in Sarajevo in March 2013 with represent-
atives on all sides of the ethnic divide. The man, who had 
returned to the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska) described 
“a permanent feeling of insecurity” that prevents him from 
regaining the feeling of home in his hometown. His insecur-
ity stems from the lack of Bosniac participation in the 
political process and administration of the Serb Republic, 
and the lack of memorialization of war crimes committed 
against the Bosniacs.
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Another man, himself a Serb who had stayed in Sarajevo 
during the Serbian siege, voiced a similar opinion and, at 
the same time, a grievance: the “four walls” of his house 
were not sufficient to generate a home-like feeling; like the 
Bosniac participant, he asserted that, in order to (re)inte-
grate, one must feel at home in “the wider area,” but the 
streets and neighbourhoods, now replete with the names of 
Bosniac historical heroes, are not conducive to such a feel-
ing among the city’s Serbian population.
These two speakers at the Sarajevo roundtable, although 
with different backgrounds, geographical origins in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and war experiences, equated home and 
home-like feeling not only with their immediate dwelling, 
but with wider scales of social and geographic space sur-
rounding it. For them, home also extends from the street, 
neighbourhood, and local community to the encompass-
ing political structure, the state, and, in particular, the 
nation. When speaking about home, they easily and natur-
ally slipped from reference to the house as home to the idea 
of home as national homeland and claimed that they could 
not restore the feeling of security and familiarity—that is, 
the feeling of being at home—in an ethno-national polity 
where they are a minority. These examples voice an ethno-
nationalized and politicized idea of home, in which “home” 
becomes conflated with the national homeland. They exem-
plify the framework of thought that stresses the utmost 
relevance of ethno-nationality and ethno-politics for suc-
cessful return and reintegration of refugees. That ethni-
cized discourse of home is common to most accounts deal-
ing with the post-Yugoslav space in the context of “durable 
solutions” that UNHCR implemented in refugee crises in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. The article challenges 
this presumed link between an understanding of home as 
nation and the evaluation of the effects of durable solutions 
in the particular context, by arguing that a more encom-
passing notion of homemaking is needed to evaluate a dur-
able solution as successful.
In the past twenty years, voluntary repatriation has been 
given precedence over two other durable solutions devised 
by UNHCR to manage refugees, namely, local integration in 
the country of asylum and resettlement to third countries. It 
has been privileged by both international stakeholders and 
national states.1 This has a political background related to 
the disappearance of the Cold War era but also a grounding 
in the “metaphysics of sedentarism.”2 In the post-Yugoslav 
context, repatriation had an additional rationale—it was 
aimed at reversing “ethnic unmixing” and recreating eth-
nically mixed areas as they existed in pre-war times.3 Most 
commonly, then, repatriation took the form of “minority 
return.” The term is used to describe persons returning to 
areas not or no longer controlled by their ethno-national 
group. Stipulated as a prerequisite for post-conflict recon-
ciliation, minority return was promoted by international 
aid agencies and foreign donors. Local integration—or 
settlement of refugees in the areas where they fled into exile 
(in this case, usually in the country in which their ethnicity 
was in the majority)—was, in contrast, minimally backed 
by these agencies, even while people engaged in it and some 
countries of exile encouraged it. I argue that both of these 
“solutions” resulted in a period of more or less protracted 
displacement and that neither brought a truly “durable 
solution” to the refugees’ predicaments, because neither 
created the foundations necessary for the refugees to feel at 
home. Empirical data show that home was not more easily 
reconstructed within the scheme of local integration among 
refugees’ co-nationals than in the place of origin within the 
scheme of refugee repatriation (in this context, minority 
return).
Furthermore, in this article I question the supposed 
mutual exclusivity of repatriation and local integration and 
critique the preference given to repatriation over local inte-
gration in the post-Yugoslav space. I argue that instead of 
dwelling on separate states’ contexts and supposedly dis-
tinct solutions, international actors should have adopted a 
transnational approach to the management of refugees. This 
approach could have elucidated transmutations and com-
binations of repatriation and local integration across state 
borders. In addition, resettlement (secondary movements 
within the country of repatriation or to third countries) 
could have been employed as a third option for resolving 
the refugee crisis. Finally, I argue that, on the basis of empir-
ical research, a combination of these two or three solutions, 
involving the countries of origin, exile, and third countries, 
seems to have been economically a most viable outcome of 
durable homemaking by refugees in the area.
In this respect, the article acknowledges and brings into 
the picture the transnational dimension of refugee mobil-
ities. It gives support to Van Hear’s thesis that formation 
of a transnational social field in refugee diaspora is an 
“enduring solution” to the condition of displacement.4 The 
article thus combines forced migration (refugee) issues with 
insights provided by transnational migration studies. In 
the specific context that it scrutinizes, it relies on studies 
that have analyzed repatriation in the post-Yugoslav space 
as an “open-ended process” with transnational dimensions 
rather than a definitive closure of the refugee cycle.5 I theor-
ize open-endedness within the transnational framework of 
analysis. Researchers have conceptualized transnationalism 
in different ways, including a variety of phenomena under 
the notion.6 Relevant for this article is the understanding 
of transnationalism as the multiplicity of involvements that 
migrants sustain in two or more societies, thus creating 
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“transnational social spaces” that go beyond geographic, 
political, and cultural boundaries.7 By their actions, deci-
sions, concerns, and identifications within social networks 
that connect them to two or more societies simultaneously, 
migrants create a single arena of social action.
The article argues that in this context of dislocation and 
protracted refugee situations, people managed to create a 
sense of home in the trans-local and transnational space. I 
propose an understanding of refugee integration that cap-
tures the notion of home as constituted and negotiated, and 
not given and fixed, as a processual and evolving aspect 
of becoming emplaced in a new environment and not as 
essentialized and naturalized attachment to the house and/
or place/territory of origin.8 In this approach, then, home 
is analyzed as a practice (homemaking) that evolves. The 
analytical framework encompasses multiple scales of 
homemaking simultaneously—house (dwelling), commun-
ity (town/village), nation. The scaling of home takes its cue 
from David Morley’s argument that “the extent of space in 
which a person may feel at home varies—from the space 
of a house to that of a street, a neighborhood, whole coun-
try,”9 and Ulf Hannerz’s distinction between homemaking 
at the level of dwelling, of town/village, and of the nation, 
polity, and/or society.10 Rather than assuming that home 
equals just a dwelling and that a successful/durable solution 
results from reclaiming the pre-war dwelling (as in minor-
ity return schemes) or that home is “naturally” regained by 
settling in the space controlled by one’s nation (as in local 
integration among co-nationals and the examples quoted at 
the beginning of the article), my analysis tries to capture 
people’s own meanings of home and how they resist and go 
beyond policy-driven and ethno-politicized understand-
ings. Empirically, the intermediate scale of homemaking—
located between house and nation—appears to have been 
the most difficult to achieve. At the same time, an enduring 
home appears to have been created transnationally.
The article is an analysis of protracted refugee situations 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. Displacement con-
texts and solutions deployed in these Yugoslav successor 
states vary widely from the situation in other displacement 
contexts in Europe and beyond, insofar as in most instan-
ces of displacement, people sought refuge among their co-
nationals in another state, i.e. in the country dominated by 
their national group. For example, Croats from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Serbia fled to Croatia, Serbs from Croatia 
fled to Serbia or to Serbian-dominated areas in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Bosniacs relocated to Bosniac-dominated 
areas within Bosnia and Herzegovina. These displacements 
led either to minority return (repatriation) or to local inte-
gration in the country of asylum, which happens also to be 
the displaced persons’ “national homeland.” The regional 
specificity of displacements and, as a consequence, also of 
repatriation and local integration schemes warrants analy-
sis. I contend that the evaluation of displacements and “dur-
able solutions” across the state borders is a necessary trans-
national context, not only for understanding refugee agency 
in the area, but also for critically evaluating international 
solutions and understanding the protracted precarity of 
refugees’ livelihoods.
Within the proposed framework, I aim to analyze a num-
ber of studies on displacement and “durable solutions” pro-
duced by other researchers of the area. My own research data 
about a case of local integration in the country of first asy-
lum inform this analysis, directly or indirectly. It is based on 
ethnographic fieldwork I conducted among Croatian refu-
gees from Serbia several years after they arrived in Croatia, 
in the mid-1990s, and almost twenty years later, in the late 
2000s. The first phase of research used participant observa-
tion and informal and formal meetings and interviews with 
mostly middle-aged and elderly refugees as well as with the 
local population among whom they settled in a locality in 
northern Croatia.11 The follow-up was done in 2009–11, by 
engaging with some of the same interview partners as ten 
or more years ago and by introducing some new ones, in 
Zagreb and elsewhere in Croatia.12
The article is divided as follows: after a brief presenta-
tion of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the rise of succes-
sor nation-states, I describe complex population displace-
ments triggered by the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as well as the controversies surrounding the 
two solutions to refugee crises: repatriation, which, in the 
form of minority return, was the focus of international 
actors such as UNHCR, and local integration in the country 
of first asylum (and also the “national homeland”), which 
was practised by refugees without international support. I 
then show how both solutions resulted in protracted dis-
placement, since refugees developed ambivalent feelings 
of “home” under either scenario. This finding is used to 
critique ethnicized explanations of the alleged failure of 
minority returns. The next section discusses how refugees 
utilized repatriation and local integration schemes in order 
to arrive at viable solutions to their predicaments. On the 
basis of these insights, I critique the assumed exclusivity of 
repatriation and local integration in refugee management. 
In the final section, before a summary of findings, I pick up 
the argument that homemaking should not be evaluated in 
terms of ethno-politics only and discuss different scales at 
which home was created among former refugees.
Background and Context
The multinational Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia 
(founded in 1943) was dismantled in 1992 following the 
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wars that raged in the territories of its constituent republics, 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The duration of the 
wars extended well beyond the disappearance of the socialist 
Yugoslavia and the creation of independent successor states 
that emerged during the 1990s.13 In Croatia, the main brunt 
of fighting between the Croatian army and rebel Croatian 
Serbs, backed by the Yugoslav national army, was over in 1992. 
However, one-third of the Croatian territory was occupied 
by the Serbs and remained exempt from Croatian state con-
trol until 1995 and 1998. The war in multi-ethnic Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which was at different periods fought in various 
constellations of the three main actors (Bosniacs, Croats, and 
Serbs), ended in 1995. The new state was consolidated by the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, which essentially institutionalized 
the ethnic divisions by dividing the country into two enti-
ties: Republika Srpska (the Serb Republic) and the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first is dominated today by 
Serbs, the second by Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats.
The wars provoked unprecedented refugee crises that 
affected the wider region. Very briefly and without going 
into detail, I shall mention some of them. Following the 
occupation of its territories, Croatia had huge numbers of 
internally displaced persons as well as refugees from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, both Croats and Bosniacs; after their lib-
eration, internally displaced Croats could return to their 
homes, but Serbs fled from these same areas and found 
refuge in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. The war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina produced much larger numbers 
of refugees and internally displaced persons among all 
three nations in the country: Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs. 
Croats and Serbs went into exile in their nearby “national 
homelands” (Croatia and Serbia), but Bosniacs could either 
remain internally displaced or seek refuge in third coun-
tries (and on a temporary basis also in Croatia). With the 
cessation of enmities, refugees started coming back to their 
pre-war areas. The specific nature of the displacements and 
repatriations, and how they are linked to the decisions to 
remain in the country of first asylum, will be discussed on 
the following pages.
Displacements and Their Controversial Reversal
It is generally concluded that the displacement of “ethnic 
Others” was “a strategic parameter in the 1992–1995 war” in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.14 Across Yugoslavia, people were 
forced into displacement by threats, the spread of fear, kill-
ings and similar deeds, because of being identified as a cer-
tain ethnic/national group. Many displacements were indi-
vidual acts in search of security that eventually triggered 
displacement of entire villages and regions. Such was the 
case, according to my research, of the Croatian inhabitants 
of northern Serbia who relocated to Croatia.15 Nationalist 
elites sometimes orchestrated displacement and instru-
mentalized people for their nationalistic politics, as when 
they helped resettle Croats from Kosovo to Croatia,16 issued 
an order to the Serbian civilian population to leave their 
settlements and withdraw from Croatia together with the 
defeated Serbian rebel army,17 and called upon displaced 
Bosnian Croats to settle abandoned Serbian property in 
Croatia.18 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the resettlement of 
Bosnian Croats into the western part of the country or, in 
the aftermath of the war, the induced exodus to territories 
under Serbian control by Bosnian Serbs from Sarajevo sub-
urbs,19 also fall into this category.
As mentioned, the politics and ideology of repatriation 
have underlain efforts of international organizations and 
nation-states to encourage and mediate the return of refu-
gees to their original homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Croatia, at the expense of implementing other solutions, 
including local integration and resettlement to third coun-
tries. Repatriation has meant mostly encouraging “minority 
return,” i.e., repatriation to areas/states that were governed by 
another ethno-national group. Minority return has emerged 
as a moral argument, a political “righting of wrongs” com-
mitted by the displacement of “ethnic Others.” Therefore, it 
was designed not only to reverse displacement, but to reverse 
ethnic homogenization as its consequence. Thus it became 
inseparable from the notions of post-conflict reconstruction, 
reconciliation, and peace process in the area.20 For the same 
reason, local integration in a place of exile—which implied 
durable settlement of displaced persons among their nation-
als—has been downplayed and rendered “taboo” by inter-
national stakeholders, because backing it would have sealed 
ethnic unmixing triggered by the war.21
Repatriation was to be ensured by property restitution, 
which was enshrined in the Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement and made obligatory for all signing parties in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.22 Thus the right to return to the 
former war areas has not become just the right to return to 
the country of origin, but to return to the areas of origin via 
restitution of abandoned, and in the meantime also partly 
or entirely destroyed, property. Similar institutional provi-
sions were made in Croatia, though much later.23
The scale of minority returns in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, measured by the figures of returned property, 
was impressive—nearly half a million minority returns 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and about 130,000 minority 
returns in Croatia.24 These figures are ostensibly grounds 
for the international community to positively evaluate their 
achievements.25 However, these statistics need some qualifi-
cation. Researchers have pointed out that only about 38 per 
cent of registered minority returnees reside permanently in 
Croatia.26 In the Serb Republic, that number hovered around 
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42 per cent in 2003.27 Clearly, property restitution, which to 
this day has been almost fully effected in both countries, 
was not followed by the return of people, and therefore can-
not be used as a proxy for the number of returnees and the 
“success” of minority return schemes.
Rather than returning definitively, people have engaged 
in degrees of return, ranging from occasional stays over-
night to permanent return. Stef Jansen, who has systematic-
ally been unravelling the unexpected outcomes of repatria-
tion schemes in Bosnia and Herzegovina for more than a 
decade,28 has discovered other interesting facts hidden 
behind the statistics: that half of Bosniac repatriates were 
actually “majority repatriates,” and that many Bosniac 
returnees (who would have become minority returnees had 
they indeed returned to their homes of origin after reclaim-
ing property, as expected by the Dayton Peace Agreement) 
ended up relocating within Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
order to settle among their nationals.29 In other words, what 
was organized as a minority return ended up in secondary 
migration within Bosnia and Herzegovina and became 
“majority return.”
Thus, instead of reversing one of the consequences of 
the war—ethnic unmixing—repatriation schemes inadver-
tently produced largely the opposite effect of what was 
expected and confirmed ethnic homogenization in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and less so in Croatia. It is ironic—and 
at the same time hypocritical—that the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, enforced by international actors on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, institutionally legitimized military conquests 
and ethnic divisions by partitioning the country into two 
constituent entities based on the control of the dominant 
ethno-national group. This process ran parallel to efforts of 
the very same international actors to reverse the effects of 
ethnic unmixing by prioritizing minority return and ignor-
ing local integration.30 The consequence of this “schizo-
phrenic” situation31 was that political structures in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina—as well as in Croatia several years after 
the war—were opposing minority return and stimulating 
local integration; i.e., they were acting in exactly the reverse 
of international efforts.
Even though it was left out of international considera-
tion as a “durable solution,” local integration in the areas 
of exile—which implied settling among co-nationals—was 
widespread. In spite of international directives and money 
put towards minority return, local processes in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Croatia were actively consolidating 
ethnically unmixed areas. As already mentioned, this was 
achieved in Bosnia and Herzegovina by majority return-
ees but also by those minority returnees, who, after hav-
ing reclaimed their property in the pre-war locations, re-
migrated to the entity governed by their national majority. 
Croatia, which witnessed significant minority returns of 
exiled Serbs, was also the arena of exile and integration of a 
large number of Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina (who 
subsequently also reclaimed their property in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) as well as some numerically smaller Croatian 
groups from Serbia. In other words, ethnic homogeniza-
tion in post-Yugoslav successor states was strengthened as a 
result of several local processes and defiance of international 
political and policy decisions: remaining in the country of 
first asylum, majority return and minority return followed 
by secondary displacement.
Both returnees and those who chose local integration 
in the country of first asylum had difficulties in making a 
home, the first in the areas of origin, the second in their 
alleged national homeland. The next section sets out the 
experiences of home among refugees in both situations.
Experiences of “Home”
Studies of returnee experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
have deconstructed and de-essentialized the idea of “home,” 
as the original place of “natural” belonging to which one 
has to return to retrieve the feeling of being “at home.” 
Researchers speak of negotiations of home rather than of 
natural reinsertion in the society;32 of ambivalent home-
comings;33 of hesitant returnees34 and they challenge the 
idea that returnees can experience their homes of origin as 
“homes” in the light of their radical transformations.35
In one way or another, researchers have called for a 
need to consider broader socio-political aspects in secur-
ing and evaluating the “success” of return processes in 
the area. They have analyzed belonging and attachment 
to places as contingent on wider social and historical pro-
cesses through which people “lay claim to a place and call 
it home.”36 Jansen and Löfving37 have underlined the neces-
sity of understanding the context of economic and political 
transformations as they intersect with changes in individ-
ual and social trajectories of refugees.38 Stefansson has criti-
cized the “de-politicized” understanding of homes by inter-
national agencies and policy-makers—that is, their idea that 
a person just needs to be given his house back in order to re-
establish himself at “home”—and has argued that the pro-
ject of property restitution enshrined in the Dayton Peace 
Agreement was unsuccessful because it was reduced to 
“small home politics” at the expense of taking into account 
the wider context of return, or “big home politics.”39 The 
author claimed that a “full sense of home” can be recreated 
only when there develops a “positive connection between 
the house—the ‘small home’ and ‘its social surroundings’—
or the ‘big home.’”40
These arguments reiterate the opinion voiced by the par-
ticipants in the roundtable mentioned at the beginning of 
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the article. However, I challenge this ethnicized explana-
tion of minority returnees’ failure to regain home. If it were 
valid, should we not assume that the home was more eas-
ily constructed under the scheme of local integration in the 
country of asylum, for the reason that refugees integrated 
among their nationals, in their “big home”?
The answer to that question is not straightforward. My 
research into the integration of Croats from Serbia in Croatia 
confirms this. The integration of Bosnian Croats in Croatia 
and that of the Serbs in the Serb Republic offer equally 
illuminating case studies of the problem. Bosnian Croats 
fled their pre-war homes in Bosnia between 1992 and 1996 
and chose Croatia, their presumed “ethnic homeland” as the 
country of exile, in which the majority stayed, even after hav-
ing repossessed their property in the abandoned localities of 
origin in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 2000s. They were 
given Croatian citizenship soon upon arrival, which paved 
the way for their local integration, but at the same time 
excluded them from international aid, since with the con-
ferral of citizenship they fell out of the category of “refugee.” 
However, their lives continued in limbo for years to come.
Unfortunate decisions by the Croatian state contributed 
to their dilemna. It allowed them to settle in the exiled Serbs’ 
private property,41 that Bosnian Croats, themselves destitute 
displaced persons, did not hesitate to occupy. This turned 
them from victims into a sort of war profiteers, which iso-
lated them even further from international aid but also from 
the local population. The density of their settlement and 
their occupation of Serbian property not only earned them 
negative attitudes from the returnee Serbian population—
which was forced to wait for the Bosnian Croats to vacate 
their houses—but also from the local Croatian population 
who, in addition, resented their alleged resourcefulness 
and privileges given by the state.42 They encountered exclu-
sion from the locals precisely when they were in a difficult 
situation of protracted waiting for a solution to their hous-
ing problem. Their housing uncertainty lasted some five to 
seven years after settlement and supposed “local integration” 
in Croatia.43 Also, they were negatively stereotyped by the 
local Croats as a “less civilized” people arriving from Bosnia, 
especially if they were coming from lower socioeconomic 
circumstances and less educated backgrounds.44 Insecure 
housing, non-existent jobs in the marginal areas of settle-
ment, failure to be recognized by the locals as the we group, 
etc., all contributed to liminality in which they lived for 
years without developing a feeling of belonging and home.
The difficulties encountered by Bosnian Croats in Croatia 
have been similar to those of Serbs who, after repatriating 
in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, embarked on 
a second migration to the other entity, the Serb Republic. 
When they are compared to minority Bosniac returnees 
in the Serb Republic, it appears that it might well be the 
Serbian secondary migrants who were in a more precarious 
socio-economic situation and encountered more hurdles 
in the process of integration in the Serb Republic than the 
minority Bosniac returnees.45 This is a bold and unexpected 
statement, especially when viewed from the dominant per-
spective of ethnicized explanations of refugee solutions in 
the former Yugoslav space.
On the basis of these insights, I contend that the settlement 
among one’s own national group does not decisively ease 
homemaking and the integration of refugees in the receiv-
ing society. Very much like minority returnees, they do not 
integrate unambivalently in their new settlements, in spite of 
the fact that their settlement occurs in their “national home-
land.”46 While minority returnees cannot simply regain lost 
homes because they come back to what are radically trans-
formed surroundings (destroyed property, economic prob-
lems, changes in politics, etc.), those integrating in the coun-
try of asylum, even though it is controlled by their nationals, 
have come to completely new surroundings, in which their 
predicaments might be worse than those of returnees. Both 
share, in one way or another, an experience that can better 
be described as that of an immigrant rather than a “natur-
alized” returnee (due to the recovery of “original” home) or 
ethnic settler (due to the recovery of “national homeland”) 
experience.47 If we are to understand the most important 
dimensions of home and homemaking in the process of 
attaining a successful durable solution, we need to look at 
economic viability as the main feature of durability and take 
into account different scales at which refugees experienced 
homemaking: house, community, nation. The two following 
sections discuss this point.
Ensuring Viable Livelihoods
As has been mentioned, repatriation in many cases set 
in motion a second displacement within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. This did not mean that displaced persons, 
who became minority returnees and later resettled inter-
nally, severed bonds with any of the places in which they 
lived at some point. In simpler scenarios, a Serb refugee 
returning to Croatia did not severe ties with the settlement 
of exile in Serbia and a Bosnian Croat integrated in Croatia 
but also reclaimed property in the pre-war place in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. In all cases, contacts between these 
places was kept on a regular or irregular basis. These forms 
of “open-ended return” led to trans-local (within Bosnia 
and Herzegovina)48 and transnational (across international 
borders) families and economies and to circular migration 
between the areas.
These developments challenge established understand-
ings of “durable solutions” to refugee crises, as distinct and 
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mutually exclusive forms. They point out that the boundary 
between return and local integration can be fluid, and that 
even with the firm intention and orchestrated international 
political and donors’ support, as well as monitored direction 
of funding, repatriation can transmute into or be combined 
with local integration in country of first asylum. They can 
be complementary and interdependent processes: in order 
to be able to enact a second migration within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, a person had first to secure property restitu-
tion in the area of origin via minority return schemes, and 
then, with its sale or exchange, could ensure housing else-
where, in the entity controlled by her or his ethnic group. 
This is exactly what Croatian refugees from Serbia were 
doing in the first place: when as an ethnic minority they felt 
threatened in Serbia and decided to leave, they managed 
their local integration in the country of asylum by nego-
tiating property exchange with the Serbian population in 
Croatia.49 It took Bosniac and Serbian refugees in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina several years, maybe even a decade, to 
achieve the same result. In other words, they spent a pro-
tracted period of insecurity and liminality until they could 
ensure some stability for their families and themselves. 
While the above scenario is specific to the area under analy-
sis, the one in which repatriation is combined with local 
integration and possibly also with resettlement to third 
countries is more common and attuned to the contempor-
ary transnational moment.50
I argue that such transnational/trans-local arrangements 
were a strategy deployed by refugees to ensure sustainable 
livelihoods.51 They have spent protracted periods—ten or 
more years—in insecure and unresolved liminal situations, 
waiting for the involved states and international actors to 
agree on a common solution to their plight, sometimes 
waiting for their houses to be vacated or rebuilt, compet-
ing for meagre resources with the locals, lacking local social 
networks, and struggling to ensure viable livelihoods and 
future for their family members and themselves. Living in 
the place of exile or in the place of return was not bring-
ing satisfactory livelihoods and durable homemaking for 
all these reasons. Linking these two places into a common 
social space did bring a solution. What helped the integra-
tion of Bosnian Croats in Croatia were not only closely knit 
social networks in areas of compact settlement of extended 
families and neighbours from the pre-war villages, but also 
transnational social spaces established with elderly relatives 
who returned to their Bosnian settlements and possibly also 
with the younger ones who migrated to third countries in 
search of (seasonal) work (e.g., in Germany). A combina-
tion of two or even three “solutions” made their settlement 
in under-developed Croatian regions viable. As it is with 
the minority returnees who relocate but whose livelihoods 
straddle the interior border in Bosnia and Herzegovina,52 it 
is difficult to ascertain where the Bosnian Croats actually 
live: they are registered in and have documents of both 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, they have two homes 
in two states and might live alternatively in one or the other 
(or maybe even in a third one) for indefinite, prolonged 
periods of time, depending on job opportunities in these 
places, while they take advantage of welfare benefits in both 
countries.53
By keeping ties with the areas of former exile or return, 
refugees have been keeping options open, spreading out risk 
factors, and creating a strategy to minimize exposure to the 
precariousness of life in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Croatia. By stressing future-orientated projects of 
returnees and the need to create economically sustainable 
livelihoods “beyond considerations of nationality,” Jansen 
has argued for an understanding of returnees’ decisions to 
relocate that goes beyond the ethnic/national lens.54 The 
notion of “normalcy” contains the same type of reasoning: 
rather than exclusively preoccupied by ethnic considerations 
(and fears of the “ethnic Other”), people strive to ensure 
good living and normalcy,55 and do not dwell on romantic 
or ideologized notions of national home. Similarly, as min-
ority Serbian returnees and locals start working together 
and sharing the problems of infrastructural deficiencies in 
the marginal areas of common settlement in Croatia, ethni-
city takes on a secondary role in everyday communication.56 
Ethnicity and an ideologized notion of home as nation may 
still be evoked in public roundtables, as in the quotes at the 
beginning of the article. I argue that such ethno-politicized 
statements reflect dominant discourses rather than empir-
ical situations of everyday life.
It follows from my analysis that refugees, no matter how 
their refugee trajectory evolved, engage in very similar 
activities, which take them beyond the ethnic and into the 
realm of economic reasoning that is managed in trans-local 
and transnational space. In the final section of the article, I 
explore aspects of homemaking in this context.
Scaling Home: Levels of Homemaking
In the cases presented, the deceptive nature of “home” for 
refugees has appeared in two ways: on the one hand, in 
the context of the recovery of pre-war houses by minority 
returnees and, on the other, in the context of local integra-
tion in presumed “national homelands.” In the first case, 
except for elderly people,57 pre-war dwellings could not 
be refilled with the meaning of home, as the naturalizing 
sedentarist discourse would expect. While some explana-
tions attribute this to drastic transformations in the pre-war 
areas of settlement,58 many more invoke the disjointed rela-
tionship of a minority returnee with the national majority 
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in the area. These interpretations prioritize an understand-
ing of home in terms of a national homeland. After finding 
that, in the context of local integration among co-nationals, 
the ethnicized argument appeared to be without foundation, 
I have challenged ethnicized explanations of failed home-
making in minority repatriation schemes. That argument is 
strengthened in this section by pointing out different mean-
ings of home and levels of homemaking among a group of 
Croatian refugees from Serbia that I studied.59 The ana-
lytical framework I used looked at homemaking at the level 
of house (dwelling), community (town/village), and nation.
I found that exchanged houses were made into homes 
slowly and over a period of time, after refugees had imbued 
them with meaning. Immediately after arriving, the refugees 
did not consider them “theirs.” But after fifteen or more years, 
the house became meaningful as the site of material input, 
investment of efforts and activities, of the implementation 
of ideas and projects. In that second period of my research, 
it was also presented as a site of family togetherness, famili-
arity, and security. The community (town or village), which 
embraces a natural (landscape), cultural (built environment, 
symbolic meanings, gestures) and social (networks) aspect 
of belonging, generated less home-like feelings among my 
research subjects. While the feeling of “home” in Serbia was 
a holistic experience embracing the entire broader area of 
the place of living, in Croatia, people continued to experi-
ence the physical and social environment in which they 
lived as not entirely “their own.” This was reiterated almost 
twenty years after the displacement. Their social networks 
are oriented toward socializing among other settlers like 
themselves, their former co-villagers, who live in the same 
or other localities in Croatia. By socializing among them-
selves—rather than with the locals among whom they live—
they recreate, trans-locally and transnationally, the social 
and cultural space of the old settlement, by which a sense 
of belonging to the old village as “the home” is imagined 
and enacted outside its territory.60 I therefore hypothesize 
that their relationship with the places in which they reside 
today, almost twenty years after displacement and the onset 
of local integration, is merely functional . They are simply 
housing locations, while only the relation towards the house 
and property is emotional .61 With the passage of time, these 
refugees who integrated in the country of asylum (which 
also happens to be their national homeland) thus managed 
to imbue their new houses with the meaning of home, but 
have not managed to imbue the surrounding area with the 
same meaning.
At this intermediate level of homemaking, I suggest, we 
need to consider economic viability. The assertion by a 
Turkish migrant working in Germany that “home is wher-
ever you have a job”62 seems to be equally valid in this 
post-refugee context. It resonates with the statement of a 
man who participated in the Sarajevo roundtable men-
tioned above: “My home was destroyed when I was thrown 
out of my job.” This is maybe the most concrete but also the 
most poignant definition of home that I have encountered. 
It lends support to a further argument, that settlement in 
the country of first asylum (and also secondary migration to 
the territory inhabited by co-nationals) can also be viewed 
as a search for sustainability and not only as ethnically 
motivated mobility. This does not deny that there was not 
an initial ethnic motivation for displacement. It was indeed 
present under conditions of heightened war and the early 
post-war situation. My research elucidates that at the begin-
ning of displacement, the refugees were indeed mentioning 
the importance of being “among their own” as a factor con-
tributing to their homemaking. In later phases, however, 
this was no longer an issue. Therefore, I reiterate the argu-
ment that in order to understand the different facets of the 
process of homemaking in the particular refugee experi-
ences, we need to move beyond ethnic/national reasoning 
and consider durable homemaking as a process linked to a 
concatenation of factors such as becoming emplaced in the 
house, social networks, and economically viable trans-local 
and transnational contexts. Only in the last resort, and in a 
short period after the conflict that had caused displacement, 
is the ethno-political context important for homemaking. It 
is further argued that the intermediary level of homemaking 
is a vital element in the development of attachment and the 
feeling of home. It is the most difficult of scales to achieve; 
it is the missing but necessary link between the concrete-
ness of the house as home and the abstract, third level—the 
understanding of home as the nation, polity, and/or society.
Concluding Remarks
The article focuses on tensions produced by ethno-national 
politics (which caused unprecedented population displace-
ments of “ethnic Others” in the former Yugoslav space, 
especially in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), inter-
national agendas (which, by privileging minority return as 
the “durable solution,” engaged in the politics of redress-
ing the wrongs of ethnic unmixing), and finally and most 
importantly, refugees’ own understandings of and attempts 
to find durable solutions for the protracted precarity in 
which they found themselves.
I have introduced homemaking as an essential aspect 
of a successful durable solution and have proposed supple-
menting the usual ethno-politicized understandings of 
home in the specific context with analyses of the process of 
homemaking at different scales—the house (dwelling space), 
community (the wider space of settlement containing nat-
ural, cultural, social, and economic aspects), and nation. 
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The first two are the spaces of lived, everyday, unmediated 
experiences of the familiar and self-evident,63 the spaces in 
which a person is recognized and acknowledged by others, 
and also the spaces in which people feel economically secure 
and can forge future plans. I have underlined the difficulties 
of homemaking at the intermediate level and the import-
ance of the economic aspect, both of which are missing 
from most analysis of homemaking. The analysis has shown 
that, in pursuing economic viability, refugees reach beyond 
immediate places of settlement into trans-local and trans-
national space. I have argued that transmigration between 
their places of origin and exile and the creation of trans-
national social fields was their own solution to protracted 
insecurities of homemaking.
Furthermore, my analysis of Bosnian-Herzegovinian and 
Croatian refugee mobilities has questioned the sustainabil-
ity of the strict distinction between return and local integra-
tion employed by UNHCR. Of these two, the first, via an 
international political consent, was given precedence over 
the second, with the result that the “real necessities” of the 
displaced who chose local integration in the country of first 
asylum rather than return were neglected by international 
and sometimes also national politics and policy-makers. In 
other words, politics enmeshed itself in humanitarian mat-
ters and brought about prolonged vulnerability to some 
displaced people while trying to help others. Paradoxically, 
even those targeted were not exempt from long periods of 
insecurity under refugee status. The combined effect of 
international and local national politics in the region thus 
resulted in protracted precarious circumstances for dis-
placed people that have required more and more financial 
input and new programs to make up for inadequate deci-
sions by international and national stakeholders.
I have argued that instead of privileging one solu-
tion—return/repatriation, especially in the form of min-
ority return—and keeping it distinct from the widespread 
practice of local integration in the country of first asylum, 
international actors should have adopted a non-compart-
mentalized and transnational approach to the management 
of the multiple regional refugee crises, pursuing simultan-
eous return and local integration in the country of exile. 
This argument takes its cue from the empirical finding 
that repatriation and local integration in exile were closely 
intertwined processes in the specific regional context. They 
were combined by the refugees in order to secure durable 
solutions for themselves and their families. Transnational 
practices and lives straddling two or more places in differ-
ent countries continue to be crucial for securing sustain-
able livelihoods. With the deepening of the economic crisis, 
transnationalism is further pursued and involves frequent 
secondary migration to third countries. This analysis then 
also shows how viability in a post-refugee context is an 
enduring search in unpredictable directions.64
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